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The energy transition requires rethinking how we produce and consume energy. Energy communities (EC) provide a recent legal framework for sharing energy, aiming to reduce energy bills and the environmental footprint of their participants. One of the challenges is adapting economic models to this technological upheaval. In this context, cooperative games, based on game theory, are valuable tools for modeling energy management through cooperation. However, despite their promising characteristics, cooperative games are limited by their computational complexity. The required computation time to solve cooperative games increases exponentially with the number of participants, restricting their application in energy management. This paper aims to propose a solution to apply cooperative game theory tools to larger communities using a multidisciplinary approach. For this purpose, a game subdivision approach based on the specific properties of energy communities is proposed. This methodology will be shown to be efficient in terms of computation time. While the game theory concepts are depreciated by limiting computing time, the sub-games method can become an interesting tool in energy management. Advantages and drawbacks in terms of energy management and game theory are discussed in this paper.

Climate change is requiring changes in energy use. The integration of renewable energy sources into the energy mix is a viable solution for electricity generation, but their intermittence forces us to imagine new ways to consume and distribute electricity. Thus, new economic models and new organizations have to be established. Energy communities are a recent legal solution to share renewable energy among local actors. These structures facilitate the set-up of collective self-consumption operations. Collective self-consumption is an interesting tool to increase local renewable energy consumption and limit energy losses on the distribution grid. Consequently, energy communities are pursuing a dual objective: reducing energy bills and the environmental footprint of the participants. However, the distribution of gains generated through collective self-consumption is one of the main obstacles to the implementation of energy communities. An interesting possibility comes from game theory, especially from cooperative games, as solutions concepts already exist to solve this kind of problem. In this paper, a payoff distribution is proposed through a collaborative game. The aim of the study is to explore ways to distribute gains generated by collective self consumptions on individual self consumptions. These gains are 8% on the total energy bill and 25% on the self-consumption rate, assuming a collective objective based on the self-consumption rate and individual objectives based on the price of energy. In order to distribute the financial gains, two major concepts in cooperative game theory are studied in this paper: the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus. The advantages and drawbacks of these concepts in an energy community context are identified, as these concepts are based on two different philosophies: The properties of individual fairness of the Shapley Value and collective fairness of the Nucleolus for energy management are therefore discussed. Furthermore, a methodology is proposed to enable a fairer distribution of payoffs according to specific energy management parameters, such as efficiency and flexibility.

To resolve the global problem of Climate change is one of the most important occupations goals for most countries in the world. Many solutions are proposed such as Sustainable Development including energy transition. Among the new and developing practices, we find individual and collective self-consumption. The individual as a participant in this type of operation must have an awareness of this policy through several actions such as education and training on the one hand and the implementation of information measures to the public from children to young people to adults, in the other hand. However, the question that arises is: “do the actors or the energy consumers know these different actions of energy management and environmental protection?” Therefore, this paper aims to investigate the level of awareness among individuals regarding collective self-consumption policies. Based on a new method of energy sharing using a collaborative game, this paper studies the acceptability of this system of sharing by actors using data analysis. Through this survey, we propose a synthesis of the answers of different topics treated throughout the questionnaire such as: background information, awareness and acceptability of the proposed energy sharing method. Therefore, we closely determine the different profiles of prosumers to better guide energy control strategies considering consumer behavior. Our study targets students and staff in the university community to integrate sustainable development especially climate change action into their daily behavior by studying their awareness. Through a survey the behavior of individuals is studied, and their opinions about the system of energy sharing considered. Keywords: Collective self-consumption, survey, data analysis, awareness, university community

While integrating renewable energy sources into the energy mix is effective in mitigating climate change, their intermittent nature requires new ideas on how to use and distribute electricity. It is therefore necessary to imagine new organizations and economic models. With an engineering approach, demand-side management becomes crucial to address the constraints on the distribution grid. Optimal energy behaviors are in, this context, often regulated by the price. Moreover, new economic models based on market logic are directed by the deregulation of the energy markets. A more recent legal way for local actors to exchange renewable energy is through energy communities often combined with collective self-consumption. They open a new approach to energy management based on ressource pooling and cooperation among consumers. This work proposes to explore a new methodology of demand-side management based on a cooperative game. It will be proved that a collective objective based on prioritizing local energy production in community consumptions can lead to individual costs and environmental impact reduction. The work integrates several motivations of stakeholders in their participation in a collective self-consumption operation. A new methodology based on the LCA method is deployed to assess environmental impacts. Ethical distributions of gains based on game theory will also be discussed. Several game-theoretic concepts are explored, opening up philosophical questions such as: Should we reward those who participate the most, but who are also often the wealthiest? Should we encourage the most vulnerable? From a technical point of view, other questions are discussed, such as: Which behaviors should be rewarded in the context of energy management? Should energysaving behavior be rewarded? Should flexibility be rewarded? The aim of this paper is to propose a novel energy management system able to meet the environmental and social challenges of the energy transition.

Climate change is requiring changes in energy use. The integration of renewable energy sources into the energy mix is a viable solution for electricity generation, but their intermittence forces us to imagine new ways to consum and to distribute electricity. Thus, new economic models and new organizations have to be established. Energy communities are a recent legal solution to share renewable energy among local actors. Joining a community can allow participants to reduce their energy bill and environmental footprint. However the distribution of gains generated through collective self consumption is one of the main obstacles. An interesting possibility comes from the game theory, especially from cooperative game, as solutions concepts already exist to solve this kind of problem. In this paper, a payoff distribution is proposed through a collaborative game. Two parrallel optimizations are established in order to compare the benefits of collective self consumption to individual self consumption. It is shown that the coordination of flexible devices to maximize the collective self-consumption rate generates gains on the electricity bill and environmental footprint. The aim of the study is then to explore ways to distribute these gains. Two major concepts in cooperative game theory are studied in this paper, the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus. The advantages and drawbacks of these concepts in an energy community context will be established. A methodology is proposed to permit a fairer distribution of payoffs according to specific energy management parameters such as efficiency and flexibility.

Environmental issues are leading to rethink the way energy issues are approached. The integration of renewables energies into the energy mix is one of the long-term solutions for electricity production. Their intermittency forces utility companies to reconsider the way energy is consumed. Indeed, consumers will not remain regarding the electricity networks but will be asked to participate in the daily management of electricity. Several solutions are emerging around smart grids and demand side management, but they are mainly focused on technological solutions. Human behaviors are rarely considered in energy management algorithms. Similarly, the environmental impacts of the whole system are rarely quantified. Recently, legal incentives such as energy communities have appeared. These aim to include different actors to participate in economic operations regarding energy while reducing their environmental impacts. In this context, energy sharing, and self-consumption become at the heart of energy issues. In this paper, we propose to integrate hypotheses from the social and human sciences into an energy management of a community. Its environmental impact will also be integrated into this management through calculations of carbon emissions based on LCA methods. The gain/loss of stakeholders if they participate in a collective self-consumption operation regarding their sensibilities on energy consumptions will be discussed.